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Caspian Sea had been actually a Soviet internal lake. Iran was too weak to be a competitor/
rival for the USSR. The collapse of the USSR had transformed Caspian Sea into the sea
surrounded by several states and each of them vie for the Caspian Sea’s natural resources.
Caspian Sea became also important as the route for delivery of oil/gas. All of this led to
considerable tensions among the states in the area and naval buildup. Even Turkmenistan,
desert republic, started to build the navy and contribute to the rise of tension in Caspian
Sea. All of this indicated the increasing global instability which followed the end of Cold
War and the end of the USA unipolarity.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.With many places in the world where the potential for
major military conﬂict is evident, the Caspian Sea usually
falls below the radar. Yet it is one of the places where
tensions run high and there is a clear potential for military
conﬂict with great implications for global security. The
collapse of the USSR, increasing competition for oil and gas
reserves in the Caspian Sea, the potential inﬂuence of this
gas and oil in global demand for these essential commod-
ities, and ﬁnally, the Caspian role as a delivery route for
Turkmenistan/Azerbaijan gas to Europeanmarkets have led
to an increasing arms race in the region. Observers usually
pay attention to the bigger players in the region, such as
Russia and Iran, due to the residual mentality of the Coldarch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, HaWar and early postwar era. During the Cold War, the USA
and USSR deﬁned the basic conﬁgurations of global affairs,
albeit even at that time the picturewas not so simple. In the
immediate aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, the USA
was the only shaper of global policies. By about the end of
the Bush era, the US economic and geopolitical decline,
both relative and absolute, had become evident. Still, no
clear alternative center of power has yet emerged. Even if
we assume China will be the paramount center in the
future, it will take time to become the undisputable global
leader. Until then, several centers of power will exist, and
parts of the world will be in a state of permanent anarchy, a
“gray area” with quite unstable sociopolitical conditions.
The area around the Caspian Sea area is one of these.
The end of the ColdWar and collapse of theUSSR also led
to global fragmentations. In the past, Pax Sovietica and Pax
Americana cemented relations between the powers in their
spheres of inﬂuence. The collapse of Pax Sovietica and the
beginning of the disintegration of Pax Americana led to new
areas of intense tensions that could lead tomilitary conﬂicts
with potentially global implications. The Caspian Sea region
is one of these. In the recent past, the region was basically
controlled by the Russian empire/USSR, with Iran/Persianyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
5 Sergei Konovalov, “Sovsem ne mirnoe Kaspiiskoe more,” Nezavisimaia
Gazeta, 13 April 2012.
6 “Voina na Kaspii mozhet stat’ real’nost’iu,” Akton Biznes, 22 November
2011.
7 “V. Mukhin: Kaspiiskoe vodianoe peremirie: V sporakh po povodu
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control over this part of theworld led to increasing tensions
between the countries in the area, all vying for a piece of the
oil/gas pie. For some of these countries, the Caspian Sea
became an important location for pipelines to deliver gas to
European markets. The volatility of the area, the unpre-
dictability of its geopolitical conﬁgurations, and the new
role of small states can be seen in Turkmenistan’s position.
Turkmenistan, one of the most backward republics of
the former USSR, has long been covered by desert. The
notion of a navy would be associated mainly with the “ship
of the desert” – the camel. Yet the collapse of the USSR and
competition for oil and gas reserves led Ashkhabad to build
naval forces. In this buildup, Turkmenistan was informed
by the activities of other states in the Caspian Sea area.
1. Russian buildup
Russia as the tsarist empire and then the USSR has been
present on Caspian shores for centuries, but has not until
recently seen the sea as having naval importance. Until the
collapse of the USSR, it was actually an internal Russian sea.
Iran, which shares the shoreline, was too weak to create
problems; in fact, Teheranwas feared tsarist Russia and later
the USSR. Not only did the collapse of the USSR lead to the
emergence of several states with their own claims over the
Caspian Sea, but it became an essential route for delivery of
Central Asian/Azerbaijan gas to Europe, a project Moscow
tried to prevent by all means. Awareness of the rich gas and
oil deposits on the bottom of the sea has whettedMoscow’s
appetite. By 2000, according to Russian observers, Moscow
also had become concerned over threats to its predomi-
nance in the Caspian region, primarily due to increased US
presence.1 It was not surprising that the Caspian navy
suddenly emerged as a great priority for Moscow. Indeed,
potential conﬂicts there are seen as more likely than in any
other areas the Russian navy operates. Russia had a four
blue water (ocean) Navy ﬂeet to operate in world oceans,
but none of these were modernized as quickly as the Cas-
pian ﬂeet.2 Admiral Vladimir Vysotskii, Commander-in-
Chief of the Russian navy, stated that the Caspian ﬂeet
would receive 16 newbattleships by 2020.3 Some observers
assumed that this ﬂeet received better ships than any other
Russian ocean ﬂeets.4 This interest in the Caspian Sea in-
dicates that Russia’s top brass regard armed conﬂict there
as much more likely than in the Atlantic or Paciﬁc Oceans,
despite 2005 and 2012 joint Russian navy maneuvers with
China. Somemembers of the Russian elite believewar in the
Caspian Sea could have global implications. Aleksandr
Kniazev, Senior Fellow of the Institute of Oriental Studies of
the Russian Academy of Science, pointed out that he “does
not exaggerate when he states that the beginning of hos-
tilities in Caspian Sea would mean the beginning of world1 Aleksandr Karpenko, “Strasti vokrug Kaspiia: Tikhoe i spokoinoe
more stanovitsia predmetom razdora,” Geopolitika 35 (4521), 5
September 2012.
2 “Sopernichestvo za Kaspii,” Arevelk Center, 14 April 2012.
3 Ibid.
4 “Rossiia gotovitsia k voine s Iranom ili za Iran,” Svobodnaia Pressa, 14
June 2012.war in which all Central Eurasia would be involved.”5
Despite its own dire predictions about the implications of
conﬂict in the Caspian Sea, Moscow noted that it could
engage in war with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan as it
already haswith Georgia if its interestswere ignored.6 Here,
of course, Moscow pointed to the Trans-Caspian gas line,
which is to send Turkmenistan gas to Europe bypassing
Russia. Moscowhas tried to prevent this development by all
means possible, for it would undermine the monopoly over
gas supply to Europe and deprive Moscow of crucial reve-
nue and geopolitical clout.Moscowmade clear that itwould
engage in war with Caspian states if they made any moves
that could endanger its interest. Moscow sent these mes-
sages not just by military buildup but also by maneuvers in
the area, the most recent in September 2012.7 While not
excluding conﬂict with rival Caspian states such as
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, Russia also encouraged their
potential conﬂicts with Iran and would not object if Iran
engaged in naval maneuvers in the Caspian Sea with their
implicit threat to Azerbaijan.8
2. The tension with Azerbaijan and Baku’s response
Not only Russia creates a problem for Turkmenistan and
implicitly threatens it with naval buildup. Azerbaijan’s rela-
tionship with Turkmenistan is far from smooth, and coop-
eration to deliver gas to the West via Ukraine or other
routes could easily be transformed into open hostility.
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have tensions over control of
the disputed oil ﬁelds in the Caspian Sea. These ﬁelds were
discovered in 1989, or perhaps even 1959.9 Azerbaijan
actually controls them, but Turkmenistan does not recognize
Azerbaijan’s claims, and disputes began immediately after
the collapse of the USSR. At the beginning of the post-Soviet
era, Moscow still held authority as major arbitrator in the
area, at least in the eyes of some post-Soviet leaders.
Consequently, Turkmenistan president Sparamurat Niazov
visited Moscow and asked Yeltsin for mediation. This medi-
ationwas apparently not too successful, and in 1997 tensions
between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan became really high.
Moscow clearly tilted toward Azerbaijan, and on 4 July Baku
and Moscow signed an agreement to develop the disputed
oil ﬁeld.10
Predictably, Turkmenistan turned to Western com-
panies. The tension grew to the point where Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan broke diplomatic relations,11 and Niazov
noted that the tension could well lead to war. In his view,prinadlezhnosti ugle vodorodnykh mestorozhdenii na more poka
pobezhdaet sil’nyi,” Central Asia.ru, 3 September 2012.
8 A. Fatulla, “Transkaspiiskii gazoprovod mozhet stat’ real’nost’iu,”
Zerkala.az, 28 April 2012.
9 Feruza Dzhani, “ ‘Sedar’ vs. ‘Kiaput’: Kakoi sud rassudit Azerbaidzhan
s Turkmenistanom?”Fergana.News, 3 July 2012.
10 Ibid.
11 “S. Shakariants: Kaspii kak vozmozhnyi novyi front regional’noi
konfrontatsii,” Central Asia.ru, 21 June 2012.
21 “S. Mamedov: Baku i Ashkhabad snova vzialis’ za ‘Kiapaz.’ Na Kaspii
prodolzhaetsia bor’ba za neftianye mestorozhdeniia,” Central Asia.ru, 21
June, 2012.
22 Sergei Zhil’tsov “Transkaspiiskii proekt,”Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 15 May,
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bad had a clear concern that its interest in the regionwould
be overlooked and, during the meeting of Caspian states in
Teheran, the Turkmenistan delegation insisted that no one
act unilaterally.13 Only later did negotiations between
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan resume, possibly because
both had concluded they needed to cooperate in the Trans-
Caspian project to deliver gas to the West. By 2008, the
leaders supposedly clinched the agreement that neither
would engage in exploration or extraction of oil or gas in
the territories in question.14 Supposedly, Baku and Ash-
khabad even decided in 2009 to solve the dispute through
international arbitration.15
But the agreement was hardly cast in stone, and the two
sides were far from a solution.16 Azerbaijan still had dis-
putes with Turkmenistan and Iran over Caspian oil ﬁelds,17
and tension ﬂared anew in summer 2012.18 Baku also pro-
claimed that outside forces – an implicit reference to Russia
– encouraged conﬂicts.19 Due to the possibility of conﬂict
with Russia, Iran, and Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan engaged in
a naval buildup in the Caspian Sea. Russia’s navywas still the
largest, but Azerbaijan increased its navy quickly, mostly
due to collaboration with Israel. In 2009, Shimon Peres
visited Baku and Azerbaijan gave Israel permission to create
an electronic intelligence network.20 After these events,
cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan including in the
military realm, increased even more. The relationship was
cemented evenmore by the presence of a common threat –
Iran. Iran, which is moving toward nuclear weapons,
created an existential threat for Israel. It also emerged as a
problem for Azerbaijan. Iran claimed that Azerbaijan is just
an Iranian province and needs to be returned to the moth-
erland, a claim justiﬁed as follows. First, Azerbaijan did
belong to Iran until the early nineteenth century, when Iran
lost it to the Russian empire. Second, ethnic Azerbaijanians
are among the Iran minorities. People in Baku stated that
Azerbaijanians – Turkic people different from the majority
of the Iranian population – are discriminated against and
should be uniﬁed with their brethren. All these factors
increased tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan
moved increasingly toward Israel, which became one of its
major, if not the major, suppliers of weapons. In 2012 Israel
provided Azerbaijan even more sophisticated weapons.
3. Iranian buildup
Iran has its own claims in the Caspian Sea. As a matter of
fact, it is the Iranian and Turkmenistan positions that12 “V. Mukhin: Kaspiiskoe vodianoe peremirie.”
13 “Turkmenistan obnarodoval svoiu kontseptsiiu delimitatsii Kaspiia,”
Fergana News, 4 August 2009.
14 “Otnosheniia mezhdu Turkmenistanom i Azerbaidzhanom obostrilis
iz-za spornogo mestorozhdeniia na Kaspii,” Fergana.News, 21 June 2012,
15 “Turkmenistan obnorodoval svoiu kontseptsiiu delimitatsii Kaspiia.”
16 Viktoriia Panﬁlova, “Ashkhabad ukrepliaet pozitsii na Kaspii,” Neza-
visimaia Gazeta, 12 October 2011.
17 Konovalov, “Sovsem ne mirnoe Kaspiiskoe more.”
18 “Azerbaidzhan otrugal Turkmeniiu za Kaspii,” Rosbalt, 18 June 2012.
19 “Sh.Affasov: Azerbaidzhan-Turkmenistan snova energeticheskie
spory na Kaspii,” Central Asia.ru, 12 July 2012.
20 Konovalov, “Sovsem ne mirnoe Kaspiiskoe more.”prevent dividing the Sea between neighboring states.21 Iran
also is strongly against the trans-Caspian pipeline.22
Consequently, Iran engaged in military buildup and
decided to create a submarine ﬂeet in the Caspian Sea.23 It
also developed a plan for moving ships from the Persian
Gulf to the Caspian Sea in case of emergency.24 Some ob-
servers considered strengthening the Iranian navy in the
Caspian Sea “unprecedented.”254. Kazakhstan buildup
Even Kazakhstan, which tried to conduct a balanced
foreign policy and avoid conﬂict with its neighbors, took
note of tensions in Caspian region. Until 2003, Kazakhstan
paid little attention to the Caspian Sea; in the ﬁrst decade of
the post-Soviet era, it had one boat and one ship.26 Later,
however, it noted the rising tensions and resources and
began a naval buildup. It built a naval base in Atau27 and
now has a ﬂeet of more than 20 ships and boats with 3000
personnel, supported by 12 ﬁghter jets and other auxiliary
forces.28 Kazakhstan, following a “multi-vector” foreign
policy, has tried to cooperate with all major players, yet
does not seem to trust any of them fully. While maintaining
a good relationship with Russia and supporting Moscow’s
proposed idea of a Eurasian Union (actually proposed by
Kazakhstan president Nursultan Nazarbaev some time ago)
Kazakhstan did not trust Moscow absolutely. Consequently,
it has cooperated with the USA in the military arena
starting in 2008, when Russia expressed resistance to
upgrading the Kazakhstan navy in the Caspian Sea.29 This
cooperation continues to the present; Kazakhstan has ac-
quired four US military ships30 and, in general, modernized
its navy with US help.31 It also understood it could not be
dependent on foreign suppliers and developed its own
military industry. In 2012 it put into operation the ﬁrst
Kazakhstan-produced battleship. In 2013, it plans a new
battleship with even more powerful guns.325. Turkmenistan’s response
In this situation, Turkmenistan engaged in its own
ambitious naval buildup. On the collapse of the USSR, it2012.
23 Dzhani, “ ‘Sedar’ vs ‘Kiapas’.”
24 Iurii Krupnov, “Kaspiiskaia karta SShA i NATO protiv Rossii i Irana,”
Iran News, 3 July 2012.
25 Mikhail Sergeev, “Ashkhabad gotovit Moskve kaspiiskii ekzamen,”
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1 June 2012.
26 Karpenko, “Strasti vokrug Kaspiia.”
27 A. Faud, “Torg s sil’nymi mira sego,” gulestan.ws, 9 April 2012.
28 Karpenko, “Strasti vokrug Kaspiia.”
29 Krupnov, “Kaspiiskaia karta SShA i NATO protiv Rossii i Irana.”
30 “Sopernichestvo za Kaspii.”
31 “Ekspert: Na Kaspii nachinaetsia novyi vitok gonki vooruzhenii,”
Rosbalt.ru, 15 September, 2011.
32 Nataliia Kharitonova, “Gonka vooruzhenii na Kaspii,” DeutscheWelleI,
14 September, 2012.
37 Mikhail Kalishevskii, “Tsentral’naia Aziia: Voennyi balans,” Fergana
News, 9 October, 2012.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 “Port Turkmenbashi gotovitsia k radikal’noi modernizatsii,” Morskie
Vesti, 2 April 2012; Aider Kurtmulaev, “Kaspii: porty, tankery i perevozki,”
Oil & Gas Eurasia, 3 March 2012.
41 “V Turkmenistane na Kaspiiskom more postroiat novyi port,” Korabel.
ru, 19 September, 2011.
42 “Port Turkmenbashi gotovitsia k radikal’noi modernizatsii.”
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of the post-Soviet era, Russia managed both Turkmenistan
and Kazakhstan navies.34 One could assume that
Turkmenistan naval forces were not only minuscule but not
actually controlled by Ashkhabad. There were several rea-
sons for compliance with Russia. To start with, the
Turkmenistan elite were just fully recognizing that they
were the elite of an independent nation. They still had
traditional deference to Moscow, which so recently had
made all important decisions, and whose language was the
lingua franca of the empire. Moscow was the source of
expertise, cadres, and investments, and Turkmenistan,
similar to other Central Asian states and quite different
from Baltic states, was not sure it could manage alone.
The same feeling could be seen in other postcolonial
nations, some of which continued to look at their former
colonial masters with deference and deep respect. Britain,
for example was often seen by Commonwealth members as
a source of superior culture. The perception and nature of
the phenomenon could be quite different, and the image
often did not reﬂect ongoing changes. For example, the
generations long decline of the US economy has no im-
mediate implications on the image of the economy, and the
role of the dollar as global currency reﬂects the economy of
a generation or two ago. (In the same way, the light of a
distant star or galaxy could reach the earth when the object
had gone millions or even billions years ago.) Such a delay
in understanding the nature of the changes in the
Turkmenistan elite collective subconsciousness might
explain why Ashkhabad was not assertive in defending its
interest at the beginning of the post-Soviet era. The second
reason Ashkhabad allowedMoscow tomanage its navy was
that Moscow continued to regard the Caspian Sea as basi-
cally a Russian lake and believed it could still manage the
space basically alone. Last but not least, Turkmenistan was
not fully aware of the huge economic beneﬁts it could
receive from managing the Caspian Sea. Still as time pro-
gressed, Turkmenistan fully took in both its independence
and its importance as a major source of gas for global
markets.
At this point, the Turkmenistan elite noted the manifold
importance of the Caspian Sea. The natural resources on its
bottom included large deposits of gas and oil; it also
became the route for delivery of gas to Europe. Friction
between Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Russia started and
was reinforced by the increasing general instability in the
region. Tensions with Azerbaijan became especially clear.
Turkmenistan was aware of being much weaker than other
Caspian states.35 Consequently, after awhile, tensions with
neighbors led it to engage in an ambitious naval buildup
and general upgrading of military capabilities. By approxi-
mately 2009–2010, Turkmenistan had increased its mili-
tary budget36 to the current level of $500–600 million per33 It was not surprising that in Moscow elite minds, Turkmenistan was
hardly related to a navy.
34 Karpenko, “Strasti vokrug Kaspiia.”
35 “M. Khusainov: Novyi vitok ‘kaspiiskoi likhoradki’,” Central Asia, 5
October, 2012.
36 Panﬁlova, “Ashhabad ukrepliaet pozitsii na Kaspii.”year, according to some estimates the third in Central Asia
after Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.37 One could assume that
navy received the lion’s share of these sums when, in 2009,
Turkmenistan authorities decided to build up the Caspian
navy.
This was actually a beginning of an arms race in the
Caspian Sea.38 Turkmenistan started to celebrate Navy Day
in fall 2011, and has announced a development program
extending to 2015.39 There was also modernization/
expansion of the tanker ﬂeet.40 The naval buildup required
naval bases and ports. In 2011, Ashkhabad proclaimed that
a new port is to be built in city of Turkmenbashi.41 Existing
naval facilities in the city were also upgraded. The port has
undergone modernization, making it usable for both
civilian and military purposes, with storehouses for “civil
defense and mobilization reserve.”42 All these efforts star-
ted to bring results. By 2012, Turkmenistan had 30 battle-
ships in the Caspian Sea, making its navy larger than
Kazakhstan’s (20 battleships) and close to Azerbaijan’s (37).
It was also reinforced by the air force, apparently one of the
strongest in the area: 250 planes and helicopters on Cas-
pian shores.43 Ashkhabad is not planning to stop at this
point: “Turkmenistan also continues to increase its military
presence at Caspian Sea and plans to buy for VMS (Navy)
the most advanced military boats and weapons.”44 And it
has started to demonstrate its naval prowess. In September
2012, it conducted the ﬁrst Caspian Sea naval maneuvers in
its history.456. Search for source of military hardware
Turkmenistan has not been able to produce its own
battleships and other sophisticated weapons, and relies
heavily on foreign suppliers. Russia was an obvious candi-
date. Turkmenistan bought eight ships from Russia46 in
2008, and later signed an agreement with Russia to provide
two military ships.47 Iran also was apparently one of the
earlier suppliers, albeit the relationship was rather speciﬁc.
Instead of selling Ashkhabad the requested ships, Teheran
gave Ashkhabad “seven patrol boats in many years long
lease” in 2003.48 According to Russian observers, the
reason for Turkmenistan’s turn toward Iran and Russia was43 Karpenko, “Strasti vokrug Kaspiia.”
44 Ibid.
45 “Turkmenistan osen’iu vpervye provedet voennye ucheniia na Kas-
piiskom more,” Fergana News, 30 August, 2012.
46 Panﬁlova, “Ashhabad ukrepliaet pozitsii na Kaspii.”
47 “V sostav VMS Turkmenii voshli dva raketnykh katera ‘Molniia’,”
warsonline, 10, October, 2011; Altyn Magaiuna, “Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan
narashchivaet svoi voenno-morskoi ﬂot,” TUS.ozodi.org, 13 Apreal, 2012.
48 Kalishevskii, “Tsentral’naia Aziia.”
D. Shlapentokh / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 154–159158clear. On one hand, for Iran and Russia, selling weapons to
Turkmenistanwas a source of cash and helped diversify the
armsmarket. On the other hand, Iran, which has the second
largest Caspian navy after Russia,49 and especially Russia
hardly see in Turkmenistan a military, much less a naval
force that could create problems. As a matter of fact, in
Russian minds, Turkmenistan related not to the sea but to
the desert and only one type of “ship” at its disposal
(camels called in Russian are “korabli pustyni,” ships of the
desert). Still, Turkmenistan understood that it could not
always rely on Russia’s goodwill especially when Moscow
realized Turkmenistan could create a problem in the future.
Consequently, Ashkhabad tried to diversify sources of
weapons including ships. TheWest, especially the USA, was
the most obvious choice. The USAwants to prevent Russian
and Iranian inﬂuence in the Caspian region, and therefore
does its best to provide weapons and improve navies of
states such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan
under the umbrella of the new Washington-sponsored
initiative, “Caspian Guard.”50 In 2011, Turkmenistan got
American patrol boats (patrul’nyi kater) from the USA. The
EU was also on the Turkmenian list of at least potential
sellers of modern weapons. The EU proposed sending
troops to the Caspian Sea area for peacekeeping.51 While
EU members might not be involved in selling weapons to
Turkmenistan directly, Europeans made sure weapons
found their way to Turkmenistan and its navy. For example,
in 2012, Turkmenistan bought two patrol boats from
Turkey armed with Italian guns.52
The West was not the only possible alternative. In 2003,
Turkmenistan bought seven patrol boats, some of them
from Ukraine.53 In 2009, Ukraine president Viktor Yush-
chenko proposed that Turkmenistan buy Ukrainian
armored carriers and tanks (bronetekhnika).54 During
president Gurbanguli Berdymukhamedov’s March 2012
visit to Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich made clear that Kiev
could be an important source of military hardware for
Ashkhabad.55 Yanukovich’s offer does not mean that Kiev is
deeply attached to Turkmenistan, regardless of Kiev’s
desire to ﬁnd in Ashkhabad a source of cheap gas and a
market for Ukrainian weapons. Ashkhabad was just one
possible customer. The Ukrainian leader also visited Baku,
where they discussed delivery not just of gas but of
Ukrainian military hardware, and perhaps delivery of
Ukrainian weapons.56 Azerbaijan with its frantic rearma-
ment process seems to be a huge market for weapons.5749 Magaiuna, “Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan narashchivaet svoi voenno-
morskoi ﬂot.”
50 Karpenko, “Strasti vokrug Kaspiia.”
51 Ibid.
52 “Sopernichestvo za Kaspii.”
53 Panﬁlova, “Ashhabad ukrepliaet pozitsii na Kaspii.”
54 Tatiana Ivzhenko, “Ukraina rasshchityvaet na turkmenskii gaz,”
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 12 March, 2012.
55 “Turkmenia pomozhet Ukraine v usloviiakh ukhudsheniia otnoshenii
s Rossiei I E S – SMI,” Regnum, 12 March, 2012.
56 Tatiana Ivzhenko and Sokhbet Mamedov, “Voennaia tekhnika v
obmen na neft’,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 29 April, 2011.
57 “Azerbaidzhan i Ukraina obsudiat voennoe sotrudnichestvo,” Rosbalt
Kavkaz, 16 March, 2011.While Ukrainian weapons would be most likely used
against Armenia, Yanukovich also played the role of
peacemaker and proclaimed he would do his best to solve
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem by peaceful means.58 Kiev
was also clearly aware that the relationship between Baku
and Ashkhabad was quite tense and that, in the case of war,
Ukrainian weapons might be used against Turkmenistan.
The fact that Ukraine could provide weapons to both
Turkmenistan and its potential enemy seems did not
bother Ashkhabad much, for it has accepted this purely
pragmatic framework of the relationship. Ashkhabad has a
strong interest in Ukraine for legitimate reasons. Indeed,
Ukraine as a source of weapons was not accidental. Ukraine
has a developed industrial base and consequently a
developed military industry – all the legacy of Soviet era –
and has been anxious to ﬁnd a market for military hard-
ware. Kiev is also aware that to be one of the major sup-
pliers of weapons and naval hardware would make its
relationship with Ashkhabad much stronger and help in
obtaining the most desirable commodity – gas.
While proposing to help upgrade Ashkhabad military ca-
pabilities, Kiev was aware this would irritate Moscow for a
variety of reasons. One was Moscow’s understanding that
upgrading the Turkmenistan military, especially its naval
capabilities, would make it harder for Moscow to exert force
in case of conﬂict with Ashkhabad. Still, Kiev did not feel it
should necessarily pay attention to Moscow. The same
thought was deﬁnitely in the mind of Belorussian president
Lukashenko when he discussed various proposals with his
Turkmenian counterpart. Minsk’s participation in upgrading
Turkmenistan’s military potential was almost surely dis-
cussed, for Lukashenko takes all available opportunities to
sell Belorussian weapons, even if the customer is such a
Westernenemyas Iran. Indeed, Lukashenkohasbeenanxious
to engage inmilitary cooperation and arms saleswith Iran for
a long time. In dealing with Iran, he was not much afraid of
antagonizing the West because Minsk was already black-
listed. Moscow was not against Minsk deals for, with all its
frictions,with Iran itdidnot regard Iranasamajorcompetitor
in the Caspian Sea, at least at present. Moreover, Minskmost
likely plays an important role as an intermediary. Moscow,
which formally joined in the tough sanctions against
Iran, could send at least some weapons to Iran via Minsk
keeping its door open for future upgrading of the Iranian/
Russian relationship if Moscow’s relationship with the West
deteriorated.
Minsk could sell the weapons to Iran and receive Mos-
cow’s tacit blessing, but could not do so with Turkmenistan.
The reason was obvious: the weapons could be used against
Russia. Indeed, itwentwithout saying thatwith all its friction
with other Caspian states, it is Moscow that is seen by Ash-
khabad as a major problem. Modernizing its armed forces
was done mostly against possible predicaments from the
Moscow side. Still, having no trust inMoscow and keeping in
mind a variety of possibilities, Lukashenko deﬁnitely dis-
cussed the ways Turkmenistan could upgrade its military
with Belorussia’s help. Ashkhabad certainly was happy to58 “Ianukovich poobeshchal Azerbaidzhanu zamirit’ Armeniiu,” Rosbalt
Ukraina, 28 April 2011.
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hardware.
Thus, as in the gas/oil deals, Kiev and Minsk pay little
attention to nearby Russia, which could well be displeased
by all the military/naval deals. Belorussia and Ukraine also
ignored EU and the USA. It is clear that neither Minsk nor
Kiev discussed with Washington or Brussels their potential
arms deals with Turkmenistan any more than their gas
proposal.
7. Conclusion
During the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, the
geopolitical picture was basically clear. The global com-
munity was divided between the two major military/
geopolitical blocs – Warsaw Treaty and NATO – who
masked their geopolitical conﬂict by ideological moralizing
and competing socioeconomic and political programs. Of
course even at that time, not all powers were ﬁrmly
attached to the twomajor centers, and many were engaged
in semi-independent plays. Still they did this because the
great powers decided not to be engaged for various rea-
sons. One was the assumption that small power activities
were not related to their vital interests and no competing
center of power was involved. After the Cold War the USA
had emerged as the only superpower, but soon enough its
economic problems and related military setbacks demon-
strated the limits of its abilities to shape the global process .
Since US problems – mostly related to the continuous
economic decline –will most likely accelerate in the future,
Washington’s inﬂuence on the global process will decline
even more. As a matter of fact, one should not exclude the
catastrophic scenariowhere the American empire collapses
with the same speed as post-WWII Britain and the USSR.
At the same time, the EU is still unable to emerge as a
uniﬁed political entity with a common budget and military
forces. Russia and especially China are rising. But Russia is no
match for the USSR, even in the most optimistic views on its
economy and military buildup. Moreover, some observers
believe Russia’s decline is continuing, due to degeneration of
its heavy industry, health, and educational systems. Russia’s
recovery is thus of the same nature as American economic
“progress”when service “bubbles”were a cover up for actual
economic decline, which has become painfully clear only
now (2012). China is still in the process of becoming asuperpower, and it will take years before it reaches absolute
predominance, if present processes continue.
In this situation, the process of global disintegration
increasingly reveals places of high tension. These did not
exist when the global powers built Pax America and Pax
Sovietica and not only fostered but froze conﬂicts when it
was in their interest. Moreover, many present conﬂicts
could not exist because the states were part of USSR or
Yugoslavia. Here the situation was quite similar to that of
early twentieth-century Africa; being part of the colonial
empire of the West precluded any conﬂict unless European
powers themselves engaged in war. In the past, the conﬂict
over the Caspian Sea could hardly exist, not only because
the USSR was much stronger than Iran, but because the
future independent states in the region except Iran were
part of one country.
Now all this is in the past. The Caspian Sea, a sea of
peace for the last century or so, has become a place of
confrontation of several new and old states, with
Turkmenistan one of the important players. In the past,
states such as Turkmenistan would most likely search for
a superpower as patron. This is not so now, when states
have much more ﬂexibility and engage in interaction
with much less concern for the positions of the strong
players. Turkmenistan, for example, claims a consider-
able segment of the Caspian Sea. Ashkhabad deﬁnitely
took Russia – the strongest power along the Caspian
shore – into consideration. Its other major concern is
Azerbaijan, another small state. It is true that Baku is
supported by the USA. But this backing is not direct and
Baku is not sure the USA would support it directly in
conﬂict with Turkmenistan. The search for military
hardware has also exhibited ﬂexibility quite uncommon
in the Cold War era, when the supply of weapons was
directly related with geopolitical loyalty. Turkmenistan
has purchased weapons from such diverse sources as the
USA and Ukraine. The USA itself did not regard sale of
weapons as a sure sign of geopolitical marriage and
became quite pragmatic, even in a way uncommitted.
Indeed, Washington provides weapons for Turkmenistan
and Azerbaijan, especially via Israel, despite the fact that
Baku and Ashkhabad could be engaged in war in the
future. All this demonstrates that international relation-
ships may be much more complicated and unpredictable
than before.
